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REGULATION, DEREGULATION AND MODERNIZATION IN COLOMBIA
                                           by Rudolf Hommes  1
A Historical Perspective of Regulation
     In Colombia, the role of the state in regulating monopolistic o r
oligopolistic activity has been of benign neglect. The governments have bee n
traditionally more active in regulating the financi al markets and in controlling
the activities of managers and large shareholders of publicly-held stoc k
corporations than in regulating economic or market power by the private or s tate-
owned companies. Moreover, the goal of state interv ention traditionally has been
to foster economic activity through tariff protection of the private sector, or
through the distribution of subsidies to the produc tive sector, and not to check
its development through regulation of monopolies or oligopolies.
     The Colombian constitution of 1886, which was revoked in 1991 ,
authorized the state intervention in the production , utilization and consumption
of public and private goods to rationalize and plan the economy, in order t o
reach "integral development". This wide constitutional authorization had to be
regulated by a law before it could be applicable. T he legal development was very
slow: In 1936, President Alfonso Lopez “capped off his reform program with  a
series of amendments to the constitution (....) whi ch specifically increased the2 David Bushnell,  The Making of Modern Colombia (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993). 189
powers of the state in economic matters, spelling out -in terms that inevitable
brought to mind the Mexican Constitution of 1917- the doctrine that propert y
rights must be limited by social rights and obligations.” 2
In this reformist environment, a 1936 law was approved tha t
prohibited the participation of bank directors in the boards of directors o f
other, non-financial corporations (Ley 16/1936). In 1959, taking advantage o f the
democratic mood that followed the fall of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship ,
reformist minister Hernando Agudelo Villa sponsored and obtained a mor e
comprehensive law (Ley 55/1959).  It was inspired in the philosophy of th e
existing anti-trust legislation of the United States which, working under th e
assumption of an economy based on free enterprise and economic freedom, atte mpted
to regulate monopoly, oligopoly and market power fo r the first time in Colombia.
     This law defined and regulated unfair competition, restrictions t o
trade, collusion to interfere with trade, price fixing and other practices that
hinder competition. The law also attempted to contr ol firms that have a dominant
position in their markets and to regulate mergers and acquisitions, requiring a
previous government authorization for the such actions; it also prohibited the
ownership of distributors by members of the management of corporations or b y
their families. This rule was a reaction to the textile manufacturers practice
to grant regional dealerships to family members or favored associates o f
management, which increased its economic and political power and extended i t
through regional networks.  It is not clear whether it was intended to prohibit
monopolies or the dominant market position of firms or simply to regulate them.
At any rate it gives considerable freedom of action to government because i t
states that firms that have a sizable proportion of  the production, distribution
or consumption of a good or service, which allows them to influence th e
conditions of the market, will be subject to government control.  The nature of
the control is not specified, but it clearly allows for extensive regulation. 3  Suescún Melo, Jorge,  Monopolios y Concentración Económica, Asociación
Bancaria, Bogotá, 1977.
This law also empowered the government to investigate violations to
the regime through various superintendencies and the Ministry of Industry.  In
theory, consumer-citizens or competitors can take legal action against monop olies
under the law, because it authorizes the same agencies to accept denunciations
of violations of the law.  But in practical terms, consumers or citizens have a
very low likelihood of succeeding because the authorities are required to ac t
only when these denunciations come with sufficient evidence of the violation ,
which would limit considerably the capacity of the public to take effectiv e
actions.   3
          While the government of Colombia has had legal capacity t o
regulate monopolies or dominant firms and to prevent practices leading to th e
obstruction of competition it has done very little in the decades since the law
was issued.  In 1993, it reinforced the legal capac ity of the Superintendency of
Industry and trade to act on behalf of the consumers but even after these ch anges
no known action has taken place. Clearly, this indicates that there is lack of
interest of the Colombian authorities to control and regulate monopolistic and
oligopolistic activity.  This indifference with the  regulation of economic power
stems from the nature of the political coalition that rules Colombia.  Th e
constituency  of government in economic matters traditionally have been th e
different business interests that are represented by pressure groups an d
associations and not the public at large.  There is no strong consumer lobby in
Colombia, nor an important populist party.  The left is splintered and has not
pursued activist goals --such as the promotion of anti-monopoly regulation - - and
same business interests for their electoral survival.  As a result of this, any
initiative that is taken in favor of a greater control of economic groups ca rries
the risk of affecting the source of campaign contri butions of the politicians of
political conditions prevail that give government a n opportunity to act more the
Gaviria administration the opportunity to carry out  reforms that would have been4  For a brief description of the alignment of political power in Colombia, as
related to economic policy-making see Urrutia, Miguel “On the Absence of Eco nomic
Populism in Colombia”, in Dornbusch, Rudiger and Sebastian Edwards,  The
Macroeconomic of Populism in Latin America  (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press,  1991) 369-386. A description of the political barriers to change i n
Colombia may be found in Hommes, Rudolf, “Social Security Reforms. A Case Study
of Political and Financial Viability.” Paper presen ted at the Second Hemispheric
Conference on Social Security, Pension Reforms and Capital Markets Development,
Inter-American Development Bank, Institute of the Americas. Washington, Jun e
1995.
5  Rudolf Hommes, Gabriel Silva, “La Sociedad Anónima en Colombia: Un Análisis
Histórico,”Estrategia, No. 44, Bogotá, May 1981, pp.13-19.
very unlikely under normal political conditions. 4
     Something similar, although with a greater degree of governmen t
involvement has occurred with respect to the regulation of securities an d
corporate practices, particularly in the fields of disclosure, stockholde r
protection, insider trading, utilizing the corporation for the private benefit
of large stockholders, the management or directors. Although the existin g
legislation permitted government regulation and int ervention in these areas, not
all administrations have been eager to strengthen or, even, develop th e
institutions responsible for developing regulation and for the enforcement o f
existing rules. During a brief period (1982-86), the Comisión de Valores was  very
active and played a role in preventing abuses against minority stockholders and
mutual fund investors. These have been the exceptions rather than the rule. The
entities responsible for supervision and enforcement have largely forma l
functions and enforce compliance to bureaucratic norms, but do not have the  power
to effectively control; and unless they obtain pres idential support, they rarely
have the power to stand up to the influential economic groups they are suposed
to supervise.5
     The origin of the Colombian legislation dealing with the regulation
of monopolistic or oligopolistic activities or with the regulation of security
markets and corporate practices is probably closer to the tradition of the U nited
States and England than to the Spanish tradition, which leans in favor o f
concessions, monopolies and licences to the privileged. The formal organizationof the laws and the judicial system in which they a re imbedded operates formally
according to the continental tradition - Spanish, French and Italian. These  legal
traditions do not mix very well with the Anglo-saxo n concepts and instruments of
anti-trust legislation because many of the concepts--specially those that re quire
review by a judge or a supervisor-- and are conceiv ed to operate in a common law
environment do not travel smoothly to a statutory system. Under this judiciary
system and legal environment, it is usually necessary that violations of th e
existing regulation be described in full detail for it to be enforceable. Bu t
these descriptions are often incomplete or leave large loopholes. On the other
hand, if too much discretion is granted to the supe rvisor or to the judge, their
decisions can be easily challenged, or they themselves can be challenge d
politically --through the media or in Congress-- by the business interest they
have affected. The result is either inaction or a political and legal quagmire
that requires a very strong political will of the executive or of the judiciary
to confront the economic power of would be transgressors.
     Governments, even when they have the ideological commitment to promot e
this type of control on monopolistic or oligopolistic activities, may not have
the power to do it. In the case of Colombia, it is  likely, though, that the main
reason why regulation of this sort has not progressed is that governments have
been interested in something else - the promotion o f industrial activity - which
stands at cross purposes with the objectives of regulation of oligopolies an d
monopolies.  After all, it does not make much sense to try to promote compet ition
through the enforcement of anti-trust legislation,  when in the office next door,
in the same ministry, they are trying to keep compe titors out of the country and
to protect domestic production with high tariffs and quantitative barriers.
     The scarce interest of the Colombian authorities in anti-trus t
activities must also be analyzed from the perspective of the historica l
development of industry. In Colombia, following the rapid growth of coffe e
production in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, industry
also developed, mainly as a result of domestic or i mmigrant entrepreneurship and6  Bushnell, David. op.cit. 174-80
7  Rudolf Hommes, G. Silva, op. Cit., pp. 13-18.
8   E.M. Velez y M.F. Velasquez, “Estructura y Funcionamiento del Grup o
Suramericana,” Temas Económicos (1981).
local capital. Bavaria, today's large beer dominant firm was founded by German
immigrants  in the late nineteenth century. As early as 1905, the Colombia n
government was using the concept of infant-industry protection to foster th e
development  of modern textile manufacturing and flour milling through hig h
tariffs for the final product and very low tariffs for its inputs. With thi s
inducement and that of the growing market fostered by expanding coffee exports,
Colombian factories that performed only the last stages of the productio n
processes sprung up in many cities, especially in Antioquia where gold minin g had
created an entrepreneurial class with capital to invest.  Other industries 6
followed the lead of textiles and were organized either through joint stoc k
ownership or through the merger of existing, smaller firms. Industry leaders  such
as Nacional de Chocolates or Colombiana de Tabacos got started this way.   7
Perhaps the most illustrative example of Colombian enterprises is the
case of Cementos Argos (Colombia’s largest conglomerate in the cement industry).
It was started during the twenties through the entr epreneurship of two engineers
who had been educated abroad. They came back from their studies with the ide a and
raised capital in Antioquia, mostly through family  connections to create a joint
stock corporation. This corporation grew quickly with the surge of public works
and the urbanization of the country in the twenties, thirties and forties. Its
savings was invested as seed capital to start other  joint stock cement producing
corporations, with different partners in different regions, or to acquire stock
of other Antioquia based corporations that would, in turn, invest in the stock
of Argos. The result is one of Colombia's largest, most diversified, profitable
and better managed conglomerates- the Suramericana Group.  It was started and 8
grew through domestic capital market financing and with local management an d
ownership.9  Bushnell, op. cit., p. 184.
     During the thirties and forties, Colombian industry got a series of
big pushes that helped and accelerated its development: There was the wave o f
fresh foreign entrepreneurship pushed out of Europe  by the Spanish Civil War and
by fascism. Jewish immigrants came from Europe and the Mediterranean countries.
They and other immigrants settled in the country, started small consumer goods
industries, capital goods producers and new modes of trade and finance - bot h
supermarkets and consumer credit can be traced to these european immigrants .
Industry also flourished during those years because, as a reaction to the world
economic depression and to its own domestic economic and financial crisis, the
Colombian government devalued the currency, imposed capital and import controls
and increased tariffs.9
Later, during World War II, not only entrepreneurship was called for,
but also resourcefulness and indigenous technological development, because many
of the inputs and intermediate goods that came from  abroad had to be substituted
by local goods. Finally, during the fifties and sixties and well into th e
seventies, the country embraced enthusiastically an import substitution stra tegy,
forcefully complemented with subsidized credit and government intervention i n
favor of industry. Foreign investment in consumer goods industries may be seen
as an immediate consequence of the import substitution strategy. In othe r
sectors, such as oil or mining, the foreign investment followed natural reso urces
and has had very little bearing in the industrial development of Colombia.
In banking, the foreign investors were very active and were ver y
important for the development of financial practices and institutions. However,
of the large banks that have played a role in the recent history of the fina ncial
sector, only one - the Banco Comercial Antioqueno- stems from a foreign-owne d
bank. All other major banks, with the exception of CITIBANK, that joined th e
country once again in 1990, have domestic owners.
In agriculture, the infamous history of United Frui t10  The bad reputation of United Fruit stems from t he 1928 banana strike.  After
a three-month strike, “matters came to a head on De cember 6, when in the town of
Cienega soldiers fires into a mass of strikers, killing...”about sixty peopl e
(Bushnell.1993. p. 179). This incident was elevated  to literature in one chapter
of Gabriel Garcia Maquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude.
notwithstanding,  there has not been traditionally large foreign investment in 10
Colombia. The same can be said for the transportation sector which develope d
primarily with local entrepreneurs and capital, with the exception of AVIANCA,
the largest air carrier that was started by a group of discharged young Luft waffe
pilots, with some foreign capital. During World War II, these stocks wer e
acquired by PanAm and sold in the early seventies to the present Colombia n
owners.
In the area of public services, there was initially  some foreign and
local private investment. All the major ports were  started by private investors,
the electricity and telephone services in large cit ies were private at first, as
well as the water supply. Most of these private com panies were locally owned and
run, but there were exceptions: The Barranquilla public services company wa s
originally owned by American capital and continued to be managed by an American
many years after it had been nationalized. Similarly, the original Bogota phone
company was owned by Americans.
During the thirties and forties, when Colombian firms did no t
continue to have access to international sources of credit, their investmen t
capacity was severely curtailed. This, together with the growth of cities an d
their inability to supply services to the urban poor created the conditions for
the  gradual take-over by the public sector. This process culminated in th e
fifties and sixties when the multilateral financial institutions --unable to  lend
to  the private sector for infrastructure investment-- collaborated with th e
governments in nationalizing the public service firms and organizing th e
centralized public monopolies that subsist today. Curiously, they now promot e
their privatization.
     To finish this introductory section, it is worth keeping in mind the11 Bushnell,op.cit., p.169
early steps of Colombian industry and the way it grew, throug h
conglomeratization, fusions and acquisitions, mostly under conditions o f
protection of the domestic market and government intervention in favor o f
industrial development.  This environment was not conducive to the application
of legislation that attempted to regulate monopoly or oligopoly, much less t o
regulate economic power. But the strategy paid off  handsomely during the initial
stages: Colombian industry grew 830% during the period between 1929 and 1957 .
Thereafter, it continued to grow at very rapid rates, until it started to slow
down in the seventies and the eighties because the  import-substitution model ran
out of steam.
The Modern Private Sector
     The origins of the modern private sector development can be traced to the
expansion of coffee production and coffee exports during the first decades o f
this century. In 1924, coffee represented already eighty percent of Colombia n
exports, which were six times the value of exports at the turn of the century.
By 1930, Colombia was the second world exporter of coffee, a position that i t has
maintained until the present time. 11
      Public and Private Spheres of Influence.  In general, the industrial
development  was a private affair.  Nevertheless, the government intervene d
directly in its development.  In the early forties, following a Latin American
fad that also had an expression in fascist Italy an d falangist Spain, it created
the Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI), a public sector development bank and
holding company with the purpose of investing in st rategic industries that would
be a key for the industrial development and would n ot be developed independently
by the private sector; and to channel credit, mostly subsidized, to th e
industrial sector.  IFI created the caustic soda production plant of Alcalis de
Colombia, took over the salt production monopoly of the state and started  a
number of ambitious and mostly ill conceived invest ments that have either failedor produced substantial losses.  The financial support for most of these pro jects
came during the sixties and until the late eighties, from the reserves of th e
social security system that were lost and had to be replenished by the central
government intervention was introduced: Paz del Río, the Colombian integrate d
steel firm, was created with capital forcefully collected from Colombian tax -
payers in lieu of taxes.  A portion of their income tax that had to be subsc ribed
in stock of Paz del Río, which became this way a privately-owned, publicly run
monopoly.  For a number of years, the market value of these shares was negli gible
and was acquired by astute investors that gained control of the company.  This
scheme was utilized later to capitalize Banco Ganadero, with the same results.
Oil and Mining. In sharp contrast with the industrial sector, mining has
been  predominantly a joint public and private sector endeavor.  Except fo r
artisan coal mining and gold panhandling, all other  mining activities are either
licensed by the government, that has control of natural resources, or jointl y
owned by public and private enterprises.  In the early fifties, under a ver y
conservative regime, the oil industry was nationali zed and ECOPETROL was created
as a state monopoly to explore and develop this resource.  As a result of this,
investment in exploration and oil production fell sharply, and Colombia, in the
early seventies, ceased to be an oil-exporting coun try.  As a result of this, it
was necessary to liberalize the regime and allow private firms to explore an d
produce oil under a much celebrated, successful but already obsolete joint -
production contract (contrato de asociación), the private firm is given the  right
to explore in a given field, bearing all the costs  and risks of exploration.  If
oil is found, ECOPETROL reimburses the private associate for fifty percent o f the
exploration costs and enters an association to produce oil on a fifty-fift y
basis.  Following the early success of the joint-production contract, it wa s
agreement between EXXON Coal and CARBOCOL, a public  Colombian company created ad
hoc for this purpose.  A similar contract was used to develop the nickel Cerro
Matoso project with the participation of IFI as the Colombian counterpart.
In  these two projects, the joint-production contract has faile dbecause the public sector has had to invest very large sums in projects that  have
been less investments is that international prices did not turn out as high as
they had been expected in the early seventies or early eighties but rather they
were about half the expected level.  Additionally, due to the high forecasts , the
project designers and constructors incurred in costs that probably could hav e
been avoided if expectations would have been less rosy.  The combination of  rock-
bottom prices and conspicuous investment did away with profits.  This led to a
reassessment of the joint-production strategy in non-oil mining projects .
Starting in the late eighties, new mining investment by the private sector was
allowed and encouraged under the old concession or  licensing scheme which places
all costs and risks on the private investors and limits the government role to
collect royalties and taxes.  This also is applicable to emeralds and precious
metals.
Coffee.  The development of commercial agriculture was also in the
private realm, although with some peculiar Colombian twists.  The mos t
interesting is the National Federation of Coffee Growers (FEDECAFE), a private
non-profit organization that was created in the ear ly twenties as a lobbying and
support organization for coffee producers.
In the early forties, the government created the National Coffee Fund
as a public price stabilization fund and established a coffee board (Comit é
Nacional  de Cafeteros) with equal representation of government and privat e
members but endowing the Minister of Finance with veto power for the ke y
decisions to determine coffee support prices, to regulate the marketing of the
product domestically and abroad, to dictate policies leading to changes i n
production or accumulation of stocks and to decide  how to spend the usually vast
resources of the Fund.  These resources came from t hree sources until 1991: from
an export tax, from the “retention”in money or stocks of a proportion of th e
yearly crop, and from the profits of the direct exports of FEDECAFE.  Thi s
arrangement has worked fairly well despite some financial setbacks and th e
nagging question of whether the control of such vast resources does or does notgive too much power to the management of FEDECAFE; and whether or not th e
resources have been spend and invested wisely.
In macroeconomic terms, the Fund and the coffee board have bee n
successful because Colombia has managed to de-link the real exchange rate la rgely
has been de-linked from fluctuations of the international coffee prices ,
sheltering exporters of other sectors from the effect of these fluctuations .
This  was achieved by regulating domestic coffee prices and collecting th e
difference between them and international prices during the boom years and b y
smoothing the down-fall with resources collected for the coffee fund during the
upturn.  Thus, the income of producers was stabiliz ed and the real exchange rate
was prevented from appreciating to the full extend that it would have apprec iated
in the absence of regulation and the stabilizing mechanism.
The management of the Fund was entrusted to FEDECAFE which als o
became an exporter of coffee, with a de-facto monopoly of 50 percent of th e
exports.  The remaining fifty percent is allocated to exporters selected an d
approved by this same organization, with the ensuing risks of croyism an d
concentration of economic and political power among a few individuals or firms.
This scheme continues almost intact to this day.  The management of
public funds has rendered the federation, the leaders of the coffee producer s
political institutions and the chosen exporters a very powerful pressure group
that also has a high degree of control over the assets of the Fund.  These have
been invested partially in coffee stocks, but also in a number of organizations
that have economic and political clout: the  Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, the
Colombian merchant marine flag carrier;  Banco cafetero, one of the largest
Colombian banks;  CONCASA, a large savings and loan corporation;  Agrícola de
Seguros, an insurance company; ACES, an airline; and several other mino r
companies, plus investments in most of the regional private development banks.
Agriculture. Other agricultural sub-sectors have not become a s
intertwined with the public sector as coffee but are constantly seekin g
arrangements to secure subsidies and rents from the government.  This has comeinvariably under the guise of support prices for commercial agricultural goods
by the state marketing institute IDEMA, in the form  of subsidized credit or high
protection from imports.  The non-commercial, peasant agriculture has lacke d
political representation, has no effective lobby capacity and has not obtained
any  significant benefits from the state despite the fact that most subsid y
programs and “agricultural development”schemes are supposed to be directed t o the
peasants and small farmers.
Finance.  Another area that has been the object of heavy intervention
by the public sector has been the financial sector.  Until the enactment of the
new constitution, in 1991, the government, through  the President, was authorized
to intervene in the financial sector on matters related to the protection o f
private financial savings.  This enabled the government to regulate all fina ncial
activities through presidential decrees.  Additiona lly, the market was regulated
by the Monetary Board, the Banco de la República (central bank), and the ban k
superintendent.  The constitution of 1991 concentrated all regulatory power on
the government and on the central bank --an autonomous authority in matter s
related to credit, monetary policy and foreign exchange policy and management.
The institutional regulatory power was retained by  the government as well as all
precautionary regulation of the financial system.
In addition to its regulatory role, the government  has been a banker
since the nineteen thirties and forties.  It created and still owns the Banc o
Central Hipotecario (BHC) -a mortgage bank; the Caja Agraria -a commercial bank
specializing in agricultural credit and an agricultural insurance company; IFI,
and the Banco Popular - a commercial bank run by the government that wa s
originally created as a popular consumer bank that would increase access of the
public to durable consumer goods but is simply a mediocre publicly-owne d
commercial bank.
Furthermore, in the early eighties, Colombia suffered a major banking
crisis caused by a combination of fraudulent manage ment of some institutions and
the effects of the international credit crunch for Latin America in the afte rmathof a coffee boom during which credit had expanded significantly and bankin g
standards had been loosened.  The crisis forced the nationalization of Banco de
Colombia and the intervention of Banco de Bogotá, t he largest private banks; and
the acquisition by the Fondo de Garantías de Instit uciones Financieras (FOGAFIN)
of a number of other medium-sized and small financi al institutions that were run
by FOGAFIN as private institutions under public trust until they were sold o r
liquidated.
Industrial Development.  Although protectionism played a role as an
initial inducement for the creation of industry, it only generated a precarious
industrial development until the big pull came from the expansion of the dom estic
market. This expansion was due almost entirely to the successful development of
the coffee sector which was facilitated posible by large public investment i n
railroads and by private transportation development. After 1930 ,
industrialization took off. The share of manufactur ing sector as a proportion of
GDP grew from less than 8% in the first half of the thirties to 10% in the s econd
half and to 15% by the end of the 40s. It continued growing vigorously durin g the
fifties and less rapidly through the sixties and seventies when it reached  a
share of 22% of GDP, but it lost dynamism thereafter. In fact, the share o f
manufacturing in GDP has been constant since 1980 (Figure 1).
     Production in the manufacturing sector was initially concentrated in food
processing, tobacco and wooden products which accou nted for 77% of manufacturing
value added in the late twenties. With time, other sectors such as beverag e
production, textiles, clothing, other light manufacturing and cement gained  a
greater share in the composition of manufacturing value added as well as mor e
sophisticated subsectors such as paper products, chemicals, rubber, meta l
manufactures and machinery.  In the late seventies,  the three groups of products
reached even shares of the manufacturing value adde d, which they have maintained
until today (figure 2).  Clearly, technological development and rapid growth of
high value-added industries is absent in the history of industrialize d
development in Colombia.12  Ocampo, José Antonio, “La Internacionalización  de la Economía Colombiana,”in
J.A. Ocampo, Colombia ante la Economía Mundial, (Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores,
1993), pp. 19-65.
The development of the manufacturing sector in Colombia had special
characteristics: In contrast to other countries in the region it maintained  a
relatively conservative structure --low risk, low technology and moderat e
investment-- concentrating in light manufacturing a nd consumer products, without
making an all out effort to produce intermediate or capital goods.  This is due
in part to the relatively less important role that the public sector played as
a direct investor in manufacturing production, and to the strategy of impor t
substitution in a small economy.
The  expansion of industry did not take place at the expense o f
agriculture.  It is remarkable that during the year s of rapid industrial growth,
the commercial agriculture developed also very rapidly as a private secto r
activity.  According to Ocampo, the agricultural sector has maintained  a
relatively high share of GDP when compared with countries of similar size an d
development.   However, the share of agriculture is much lower than that o f 12
other comparable and more dynamic countries such as Indonesia and Thailand.
Industrialization, fostered by an import substitution scheme, did no t
contribute  to a dynamic development of export industries.  Exports were 2 4
percent of GDP in the last half of the twenties and this share was graduall y
reduced to 16 percent in the mid and late sixties a nd to 14 percent in the early
eighties.  The mixed strategy of import substitutio n cum export promotion of GDP
and exports did not begin to gain ground again until the trade regime began to
be liberalized in the late eighties (Figure 3).  The well known story of th e
Asian tigers points to a different path in which exports gain an increasing  share
of GDP.  However, exports have diversified substantially, making the economy  much
more resilient to external shocks (Figure 4).
Patterns of Concentration.
The concentration of the industrial sector has been substantial since13  Colombia: Industrial Competition and Performance , a World Bank Country Study,
(Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1990), p. 45. Notice that in this study th e
concentration scale goes from highly concentrated to competitive.  This ma y
create semantic confusion since competitive subsect ors in this context are those
that are less concentrated, not necessarily the more efficient.
14  Ibid., pp. 56-62.
its beginnings and has increased over time.  In a very thorough analysis of the
Colombian  industrial sector, Kristin Hallberg shows that the proportion o f
industries at a four-digit level “with highly and m oderately concentrated market
structures has increased over time, with a corresponding decrease in th e
proportion of industries with less concentrated market structure.”   In 1968, 13
the share of total manufacturing production corresponding to moderately an d
highly  concentrated industries was 47.2%; in 1984, the share of these sam e
industries had grown to 65.3% (Table 1).  Moreover, a greater degree o f
concentration is shown in capital goods industries (Table 2) --where th e
moderately and highly concentrated industries have a share of 85.1% o f
production, and in intermediate goods where the share amounts to 78%, --than in
consumer goods where the share of subsectors subjec t to moderate competition and
strong competition is 53.5% and has grown since 1968.  The intermediate an d
capital goods industries have enjoyed a significant ly lower degree of protection
from external competition than the consumer goods sectors.  This would suggest
that there may be a positive relationship between industry concentration an d
degree of openness to the foreign competition and t he tendency of sectors facing
international competition to require larger firms t o compete.  However, Hallberg
did not find any pattern or clear association between the degrees of interna l and
external competition.  For example, she found that some highly concentrate d
sectors such as beer and non-alcoholic beverages and non concentrated - -
competitive-- sectors such as paper containers, knitting mills or bakery pro ducts
were equally subject to very little external competition. 14
TABLE 1
Concentration of Production, 1968 and 19841968 1984
No.industries No.industries % %
Highly 16 18.0 19 26.4
 Concentrated
Moderately 26 29.2 28 38.9
 Concentrated
Moderately 28 31.5 22 30.6
 Competitive
Competitive 19 21.4 3 4.2
   TOTAL 89 100.0 72 100.0
Source: Misas (1988).  The total number of four-digit industries refers to
the number analyzed in each of the two years.  The definitions o f
the concentration categories are:
Highly concentrated: 75 < CR4 # 100
Moderately concentrated: 50 < CR4 #  75
Moderately competitive: 25 < CR4 #  50
Competitive:  0 < CR4 # 25
Note: Taken from Colombia.  Industrial Competition and Performance.  
TABLE 2
Concentration by Type of Industry, 1968 and 1984
(as % of industries analyzed) 
Consumer Goods Intermediate Goods Capital Goods
1968 1984 1968 1984 1968 1984
Highly 15.1 20.6 35.3 39.0 10.9 8.9
 Concentrated
Moderately 20.9 26.0 13.6 39.0 13.4 76.2
 Concentrated
Moderately 46.8 31.7 36.4 22.0 41.8 14.9
 Competitive
 Competitive 17.2 21.8 14.7 0.0 33.9 0.0
TOTAL    100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Misas (1988).
Note: Taken from Colombia.  Industrial Competition and Performance.
Another very interesting finding of the same study is the
relationship between the price cost margins and the growth of productivity
with the degrees of internal and external competition.  It was found that15  Ibid., pp. 65-67.
16  Ibid., p. 55.
17  Leff, Nathaniel, “Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in th e
Developing Countries: The Economic Groups”,  Economic Development and Cultural
Change; 26(4), July 1978, pp. 661-75
industries in markets facing greater competition, be it domestic or
international, showed lower price cost margins than firms in less competitive
markets.  In the same way, subsectors with more competition showed higher
rates of total factor productivity growth than sectors facing less
competition.   Clearly, all these findings are arguments in favor of opening 15
up the economy and they were in fact the main arguments for doing so in 1990-
1991.
Ownership and Conglomerates.  The patterns of ownership of
Colombian firms are also very concentrated, and have become more concentrated
over time.  Gini coefficients calculated for the distribution of ownership of
firms listed in the stock exchange show that concentration increased
substantially between 1973 and the early eighties,  when several of the 16
principal firms in the stock exchange were taken over by conglomerates.
In many developing countries, “a significant part of the domestic
and privately owned industrial sector, and particularly the activities which
use relatively modern and capital-intensive techniques is organized in a
special institutional pattern.  Following the Latin American term, we may call
this structure the ‘group’, although this pattern of economic organization is
also common, with different names, in Asia and Africa.”   Likewise, in 17
Colombia, the feature that dominates is the group or conglomerate.  Since the
early thirties, firms have attempted to integrate horizontally to corner
specific markets and establish monopolies - like the beer monopoly or the
cement oligopoly, for example-and, at the same time, they have integrated
vertically to establish barriers to entry for prospective new competitors.
During the decades of import-substitution growth strategies and18  Colombia: Private Sector Assessment, Draft Report No. 13113-CO, (Washington,
World Bank, August 1994), Annex II.
19  During the late eighties Bavaria maintained very large idle cash deposits in
the Colombian central bank, while AVIANCA was obtaining subsidized credit from
the same bank.   Postobon boasted not to need any credit to finance it s
acquisitions of other soft-drink bottlers.  This changes after the opening o f the
economy when both groups started to expand into other activities.
intervention of the government in the economy to protect specific industries
and to promote others, it became profitable for conglomerates to extend into
the financial sector to capture the rents provided by government through
subsidized credit and into the media to acquire political control.  In this
way, the modern Colombian conglomerate typically owns a “cash-cow”in a low
competition sector, not subject to external competition, and protects entry
into this market by vertical integration up- and down-stream.  Furthermore, it
owns a bank or a large financial institution and has access to the media
through direct ownership of a media channel or through heavy advertising in
independent media.  The clearest examples of this pattern are the
Santodomingo, Suramericana and Ardila conglomerates and the FEDECAFE group,
which are among the four or five dominant economic organizations in
Colombia.   Typically, these conglomerates generated liquid resources far in 18
excess of their cash requirements for the expansion of their core activities,
which produce for a small protected domestic market and not for exportation. 
Bavaria and Postobon are the examples of cash cows generating the liquidity
that the group utilized to finance other acquisitions in the age of import
substitution and capital controls.   The limited extent of the market and the 19
practical prohibition of expansion abroad that remained the rule for several
decades facilitated or forced the channeling of funds initially to vertical
and horizontal integration through mergers and acquisitions, and later into
diversification of the conglomerate.
The management strategies vary from one conglomerate to the
others.  For example, the Santodomingo and Ardila conglomerates management
directly involved in the management of the different firms.  Although both20  The Superintendencia de Valores and the Superintendencia de Sociedades are
responsible for the protection of small stockholders.  However, they are fairly
ineffective in pursuing this goal.  For example, th e Santodomingo group has used
Bavaria as collateral for loans to other group companies that do not have th e
same shareholders and has sold stock of other group  companies to Bavaria without
eliciting any intervention by these agencies in defense of the interest of t hird-
party stockholders.
groups are managed as if they were wholly-owned, the core firm of the
Santodomingo conglomerate is an open stock corporation with thousands of small
stockholders, while the Postobón equivalent of the Ardila group is a family-
owned corporation.  Suramericana firms are all open stock corporations and are
run more independently by professional managers that collectively comprise the
management committee of the conglomerate.  Although it also has a centralized
management that sets the objectives for the whole group and establishes
constraints for the individual firms, the managers have independence and are
accountable for results to the stockholders in a traditional way.
It is possible that conglomerates in Colombia have been economically
inefficient since they did not always seek economies of scale or scope and
some of their investments would probably not be able to subsist in a more
competitive environment or if government enforced the existing regulations for
protection of minority shareholders.  This is so because some of the groups
that manage the conglomerates can and may use the financial power of the core
companies to enlarge their own empires at the expense of the smaller
shareholders.  For example, it is not clear whether the group of stockholders
that have the controlling interest in a stock corporation can legally use its
cash flow or its credit-worthiness to finance the acquisition of other
companies by the controlling stockholders; or if they can sell goods or
services to the company in less-than-competitive conditions.  These practices
have been common in the formation of the conglomerates and are still used as
levers for their expansion.  More stringent application of existing laws and
regulations would prevent their utilization and probably slow this process.   20
Given the present character of Colombian politics and the public opinioninfluence of conglomerates, it is not very likely that in the near future,
governments would introduce more effective anti-trust legislation, preventing
the creation of barriers to entry through vertical integration and the rent-
seeking and augmentation of political power through accumulation of economic
power.
Recent Reforms and their Impact on Competition
Although conglomerates cast a large shadow over Colombian
politics, there are times when the political atmosphere is more favorable to
reforms because the attention of the country is focused in different problems,
or because the political forces are re-aligning and the popular constituency
has a chance to express its desire for change.  This happened during the 1990-
1994 Gaviria administration, particularly during its first two years.  The
country had experienced a political shock after the confrontation of the
Medellin drug organization with the authorities, that launched an
unprecedented period of terrorism, and the assassination of several
presidential candidates, including the leading liberal candidate Luis Carlos
Galan who had opposed the Mafia barons many years before other politicians
deemed it necessary to follow suit.  This crisis, like most crises opened
avenues for reform that were cleverly used by Gaviria and his team.  Their
reforms spanned a wide range of activities: The constitution was changed for
the first time after hundred and five years; trade was liberalize; price
controls were removed; a financial sector reform was approved by Congress; the
exchange control system was liberalized and revamped; obstacles to foreign
investment were completely removed; the regulatory framework was modernized
and some of the supervisory agencies were given more teeth.  The government
initiated a reform of the state, opening up investment in public services to
the private sector, as well as in telecommunications and ports, and a modest
privatization program was initiated.  A summary of the principal reforms will
be provided in the following sections.  A more extensive description of the
main legal changes is contained in the Annex, at the end of this chapter.21  Luis  Alfonso Torres, “La Reforma del Régimen de Comercio y la Apertur a
Económica,” in Olga Lucía Acosta and Israel Fainboim, eds.,  Las Reformas
Económicas del Gobierno del Presidente Gaviria: Una Visión desde Adentro ,
(Bogotá, Ministerio de Hacienda, 1994), pp. 61-76.
Apertura.
In 1990, Colombia had the highest tariffs in the region and, together
with Ecuador, it had the least open economy of the Andean countries.
Accordingly, from the point of view of fostering competition, the most
important reform undertaken by the Colombian government is what is called the
"apertura"or opening of the economy to foreign trade and foreign investment.
These reforms were implemented by the Gaviria administration between 1990 and
1991, although a very timid action in the same direction had been started by
the preceding Barco administration. 
The foreign trade reform started in 1990 was much more ambitious
and straight-forward.  During the first four months of the Gaviria
administration, quantitative restrictions were practically eliminated.  This
involved moving from an environment of quantitative input restrictions such as
import quotas, import licenses and lists of products of forbidden importation,
to free trade.  At the same time, the reduction of import tariffs was
accelerated.  After a hesitant start, they were cut from an average of 36.8
percent in 1990 to 12 percent in 1991.  The average effective protection was
reduced from 75% in 1989 to 34% in 1991 and to 21% in 1992.  Although some
tariffs have been increased due to political pressures or in response to price
fluctuations in international markets, the tariff structure has remained
largely unaltered since 1991. 21
The reaction of private sector to “apertura” as well as to the
trade integration with Venezuela and Ecuador was generally favorable among
industrialists who rose to the challenge of investing in new plant and
equipment, changed their production structures and have generally increased
labor productivity year after year following the 1991 changes.  In theagricultural sector the response was largely negative and the government had
to back-pedal some of the changes in 1993, when the low international prices
of agricultural goods such as rice and cotton increased the competition of
foreign products in these markets.
As time elapses, policies such as the use of reference
international prices for some products, or the intensification of anti-dumping
suits and the use of safeguard clauses in international trade agreements are
beginning to undermine the initial opening of the economy that was achieved in
1991.  This drift to higher protectionism is a natural process because there
are no strong consumer lobbies in Colombia and all the pressure is in the
direction of more protection.  However, this is not exclusively a Colombian
trait, it occurs everywhere, even in countries where consumers are organized. 
Unfortunately the rules of collective choice are biased in favor of
protectionism since few benefit from it substantially while most pay a small
amount for it.  The disproportionate difference between individual benefits
and collective costs works in favor of active and powerful associations of
producers, not of consumers.
The consequences of the “apertura” on the market structure of the
productive sectors is not yet clear.  As a result of the “apertura”, there
were no immediate business failures or significant plant closing.  What has
been noticeable is a shift from the use of domestic raw materials to imported
intermediate goods and much higher private investment.  Additionally, labor
productivity in the manufacturing sector has increased and consequently,
employment in this sector is growing well below output.
The conglomerates have been expanding inside the country and
abroad, branching out to other industries and seeking economies of scale and
scope.  Although their core industries have not been affected by foreign
competition, internal competition has become more intensive in the beer and
soft-drink markets, for example.  In those areas where conglomerate interests
were affected - foreign competition through different means.  Overall,“apertura” has been a shot in the arm of the industrial sector, introducing
much needed dynamism and increasing the potential of foreign competition and
thus the need to invest and update technology and trading patterns.  If
anything, the apertura will probably force consolidation -mergers, strategic
associations- and more concentration internally, but it will also render more
competitive firms.
Constitutional Reform and Derived Legislation .  The constitutional
reform of 1991 laid new ground rules for the relationship between the state
and the private sector and between firms.  It established that the economic
activity is limited by the public interest, that free competition is a
universal right and that the state is responsible for impeding restrictions to
economic freedom.
Additionally, the new constitution, following the 1936 tradition,
authorized the state to intervene in the general direction of the economy and
in all sectors to "promote productivity and competitiveness" --which may be a
contradictory mandate in some cases--, to foster rationality in the use of
resources and to protect the environment and the quality of life. 
Furthermore, it prohibited the creation of legal monopolies but kept alive
state monopolies such as liquor production or gambling.
The constitution defined banking, insurance and all other
financial services, including the exchanges, as activities of public interest
that cannot be entered without express authorization of the state and directed
the government to regulate these activities.
No initiative has been presented to Congress leading to the legal
development of the articles of the constitution that deal with the regulation
of monopolies or oligopolies, and there is a very high probability that such a
legislation would be effectively blocked by the lobbies of the conglomerates
that operate in highly concentrated markets. In fact, the constitutional
Assembly attempted to draft articles dealing with the concentration of
economic power and its political consequences; this was blocked successfully Artículo 20 Transitorio, Ibid., p.152
22
by the conglomerate lobbies. Nevertheless, the constitution left a small door
open for reform that would lead to increase the capacity of the state to
regulate oligopolies and monopolies because it authorized the government to
restructure the government agencies to make them consistent with the new
constitution.  The government used this authorization to restructure the 22
Superintendency of Industry and Commerce, giving it new powers to increase the
applicability of the existing legislation to regulate monopoly and oligopoly
and to intervene in cases of abuse of dominant position or obstruction of
competition (Decreto 2153/1992).  Additionally, the norms defined when and how
the Superintendency can act in cases of mergers and acquisitions.
With its new charter, the Superintendency could act very
forcefully to promote competition and to check violations of existing norms,
with a wide field of action in the industrial and commercial sectors and
following up complaints in the public services sectors.  However, during the
first two years of operation under the new charter, the Superintendency did
not act on any case dealing with restriction of competition, free trade or
abuse of the dominant position and it would be a wonder if it did.  The firms
that operate under extreme monopolistic conditions, or even those that operate
in oligopolistic markets in Colombia, either operate very large communication
networks spanning radio and TV stations throughout Colombia, or have strong
influence in the media through their advertising expenditure.  Under these
conditions, aspiring civil servants will very rarely risk, without the support
of higher echelons in the government, the social and political costs of
confronting the economic power of their would-be  victim.  As a result; even
with an enhanced charter, the Superintendency is as pertaining to the control
of monopolies or oligopolies.  This will remain without change until the
higher government decides to act.  When this will take place, it will be
equipped with sufficient legal tools for the task.Price Controls.  Traditionally, the Colombian government actually
helped the leading firms in various markets to set non-competitive prices or
to obtain above normal profits through the mechanisms of price control that
were in operation before the Gaviria administration and were largely abolished
by 1994.  In the past, the government set the prices of beer, soft drinks,
tires, transportation equipment, paper, medicines and numerous other articles. 
This was done in coordination with the private sector through elaborate
negotiations that included revisions that often surpassed inflation; and
prices were set above the costs of the most inefficient producer.  The result
was that prices of “controlled”products often increased more than those of
“free” products, that the prices set by the government generated large rents
for the more efficient producers, and that in combination with external
protection, severely taxed the Colombian consumer.
The Gaviria administration liberated most of these prices and
opened the markets to foreign competition as an instrument of price control. 
Very rapidly, the prices of tradeable goods such as tires and paper began to
decrease in real and relative terms.  Others, such as beer or soft drinks
continued to grow with inflation, but not above.
Financial Sector Reform the government sought to liberalize the
financial sector in 1990 but met with fierce opposition by the management of
the central bank that used all its considerable prestige and political power
to prevent a full liberalization.  A compromise solution was drafted into a
new statute for the financial sector that allowed greater competition in the
sector, permitted foreign ownership of banks and brought down many of the pre-
existing barriers to entrance.  The new regulation also helped to increase
transparency and created more effective rules to promote disclosure of the
real financial situation of banks and financial institutions.  Despite this
progress, the new system continues to induce market segmentation and to
prevent competition, although to a lesser degree.
After the 1991 constitution was approved, the government had to go23  Acosta and Feinboim, op. cit., 127-132.
24  The Colombian Departamento Nacional de Planeación estimated that Colombian
firms paid an over-cost of about 10 percent of the border price of imports and
exports  due to port, transportation and infraestructure deficiencies.  Th e
deregulation of transportation has brought tariffs down considerably an d
something similar has happened to port tariffs.  This will promote competition
not only in those services, but also by removing implicit trade barriers imb edded
in the inefficiencies of ports and transportation.
to Congress for a new law that regulated the intervention of the government in
the financial markets.  It created new opportunities for competition in the
sector and brought down even more the barriers to entry, just stopping shy of
authorizing universal banking.
Although these laws introduced more freedom and potentially more
competition in the financial markets, and although the quality of government
intervention and supervision has improved substantially as a result of the
reforms, the sector remains over-regulated and segmented.  Financial
institutions still show very large margins and only two new banks has been
created since 1990, although a number of financial institutions including
financial cooperatives have transformed into commercial banks.
The Regulation of Public Services.  According to the constitution,
the state is responsible for the efficient provision of public services. 
Following the prescriptions of the new constitution, all basic services were
re-regulated (Law 142/1994).  Special commissions were created for energy,
telecommunications, water supply and sewage that are responsible to foster
competition in their sectors, inhibit practices that are restrictive to
competition, set guidelines for tariffs, including caps or maximum rates of
return, regulate licenses, and oversee costs. 23
The reform of the public services regulation -including the
deregulation of transportation and the privatization of ports  and the 24
authorization of private investors to participate in the provision of public
services- was aimed at increasing competition, eliminating the pre-existing
public sector monopolies and increasing the capacity of the government tocontrol and monitor practices by the dominant firms in each sub-sector.  The
most significant innovation of this legislation is that anybody can organize
and operate firms to supply public services, within the existing legal
constraints.  In the past, this had been reserved exclusively for public
enterprises.
The new regulatory framework for the provision and distribution of
public services authorizes government intervention to promote free competition
and to suppress the “abuse of a dominant position in the market” by private
and public enterprises.  It covers the whole realm of public services ranging
from water supply, local garbage disposal to street cleaning and
telecommunications.
Central and local governments are forced to grant operating
licenses and to allow private firms to build and operate the networks that are
required for their business.  Governments cannot grant monopolies or special
privileges to any supplier of public services that are not available to others
under the same conditions.  These firms, public or private, must avoid
privileges or unjustified discrimination and must abstain from any practice
that would restrict competition or constitute “disloyal competition.”  These
practices consist of setting tariffs below operating costs, collusion
agreements and abuses of a dominant position is also defined as imposing
conditions on the buyers that would affect their freedom to operate a business
or unduly limit the liability of the supplier.
This law also obligates the owners of networks to give access to
all suppliers, at the same prices, to deliver the services to consumers.  The
enforcement of these laws is the responsibility of the Superintendency of
Public Services.  This agency is empowered to supervise public service
suppliers and distributors and to ascertain that their operations comply with
the new regulations.  It can impose fines, suspend the operation of a supplier
or directly intervene the management of the firms when violations occur.  The
regulatory commissions have the responsibility for regulating the supply ofpublic services and to promote competition between suppliers when it is
economically desirable in terms of efficiency and quality of the services
provided.  They are authorized to regulate tariffs, issue quality norms,
provide standards pertaining to the supply and distribution contracts of
public services and encourage systems that increase the efficiency or quality
of services or lower the supply costs.  They have been empowered to order
mergers of suppliers, or to divide the firms into independent components when
these actions contribute to promote competition or to increase efficiency. 
They regulate the access of suppliers to networks and the conditions of
utilization of networks.  They can also regulate the nature and size of the
subsidies that have to be provided by the government to low-income families;
and they can adopt policies to promote the diversification of ownership of
public service companies and can regulate the equity composition of those
firms to avoid excessive concentration of ownership.  The commissions may also
act as arbiters in conflicts between suppliers or between them and the users. 
They must define the rules for the participation of the private sector and for
the relationships between firms in the sectors that are regulated by them.
Having been issued at the end of the Gaviria administration, most
of these laws have not been exposed to the test of time.  And it will probably
take a long time before there is real competition in the public services
because private investment is still timid and the authorities not quite sure
how to deal with it.  But, at any rate, it is now possible to develop most
public services without having to wait for the state to gather enough
resources to do it; and in the future it will be possible that the local
public utilities can be privately run.  This was impossible even in the late
eighties.
Privatization.  The opening of the public services sector to
private companies is the most important step undertaken by the government in
favor of privatization.  This will increase the participation of the private
sector in activities that had been monopolized by the state, it will increasecompetition and hopefully it will increase the quality of public services. 
However, private foreign and domestic investment will not flow freely to these
sectors until the majority of the supply and distribution facilities will be
privatized.
The government took very serious steps to privatize the banking
sector that had been substantially nationalized during the first half of the
eighties.  It sold initially two small banks and a medium bank to private
investors, began to privatize Banco Cafetero and sold Banco de Colombia and
the public share of Banco Ganadero and CORPAVI to private Colombian and
foreign investors.  This changed significantly the structure of ownership of
the Colombian financial sector because the private sector now owns more than
50% of the combined equity of financial institutions, while in 1990, the
public sector owned the majority.  The government also plans to privatize
Banco Popular and Banco Central Hipotecario so that 60% of the sector would be
in private hands.  IFI, the largest development finance company has not been
scheduled for privatization and continues to invest in dubious projects while
it offers for sale, simultaneously, its shares of equally dubious companies
that it acquired in the past.
Other privatizations have been numerous but not important, partly
because the Colombian government had not followed the lead of other countries
in the continent where governments owned an important share of the industrial
and mining sector; and partly because the important holdings --TELECOM and
ECOPETROL--are not for sale.  Apart from these two companies, the list of
public firms and assets that would be sold is not very large: IFI and its
investments, CARBOCOL (coal), important assets in the electrical sector that
include a hydroelectric generation facility, a thermoelectric plant and the
governments shares in ISA (electric generation and national grid).
CARBOCOL and two of the electrical generation plants have been
restructured and can be sold when the decision is taken.  ISA is being
reorganized into two companies - the national distribution grid and the25  Ibid., p. 72.
generation plants.  The government plans to sell stock of the generation
company to the private sector.  Other assets to be privatized include IFI’s
portfolio of investments - basically shares in PROPAL and Monomeros Colombo-
Venezolanos, stocks owned by ECOPETROL in companies that are also owned by the
private sector (TERPEL and PROMIGAS) and the Flota Mercante Grancolombiana.   25
Given the financial needs of the Colombian government, the poor state of
infrastructure in the country and the existing plans to substantially increase
the public spending in education, health and social services, this assets will
be privatized if the private sector want them.  The privatization of TELECOM
probably will never take place and Colombians have not even started discussing
whether or not they want to privatize ECOPETROL.
Telecommunications.  Telecommunications in Colombia had not
developed at the pace required by private sector development.  In part, this
was due to the state monopoly of telephone services and to the constraints
imposed on investment by this type of ownership, since the public companies
were prevented from increasing their investment either because they did not
have access to capital or because the adjustment programs of the public sector
precluded such investment.  During the first two years of the Gaviria
administration, a plan was developed to privatize the state monopoly -TELECOM-
maintaining the monopoly it enjoys in domestic and international long-distance
services for a period of 10 years.  The government did not wish to grant a
permanent monopoly license to the private sector but it was thought at that
time that a temporary monopoly concession would bring up the price paid by the
private sector.
Any form of privatization of TELECOM was opposed by the firm’s
union.  When it was announced that the government would seek Congressional
authorization to sell the company the union went on strike and interrupted
communications isolating Colombia from the rest of the world and creatinghavoc in internal communications.  Not being able to stop the strike or to
operate an alternative communications system, the government had to withdraw
this proposal and change strategy.  The new strategy entailed opening the
value added, long distance and cellular phone services to private investment
and allow a gradual fade-out of TELECOM.  This strategy has begun to show
results.  The cellular phone service was licensed to six companies for fees
exceeding one billion dollars and is operating in the main cities.  The
private sector has been able to develop private communication services that
have upgraded the quality of services available and would undermine the
strength of TELECOM’s union in the case of an eventual future confrontation. 
Domestic long-distance operation can be licensed to private operators at any
time, if the government gives the go-ahead, and international long-distance
services can also be granted in the new legal environment created by the
public services law.  Moreover, the opposition of the unions is not as strong
as in the past, nor their power.  In fact, they were although they opposed it,
they did not use their technical capacity to obstruct communications and to
prevent in this manner the passing of the law.
The Political Environment of Regulation
so far, this chapter has provided an overview of what has happened
in Colombia in terms of regulation and control of monopolies and oligopolies
and of what is happening after the 1990 - 1994 reform period.  The bottom line
is that there is enough legislation to deal with monopolies and oligopolies
and insufficient action on the part of the government, the political parties,
the leftist intellectuals or even the populist factions of the ruling parties;
nor are there relevant civil organizations such as consumer advocacy groups
that have taken the defense of consumers, nor groups of consumers that have
taken class actions against monopolists for any violation of their consumer
rights.  This generalized indifference can be attributed to a number of
reasons: Insufficient political development in the sense that the individuals
do not regard the state as a vehicle for safeguarding their interests and donot sue or appeal to the supervisory agencies in defense of their rights. 
Insufficient independence of the bureaucracy from the political process and,
more importantly, from the economic interests and power centers.  Governments
had not perceived that by not promoting competition, they were fostering
technical stagnation and facilitating the laziness of private investors. 
Moreover, the political parties, drawing resources from the private sector to
finance their electoral campaigns, have surrendered much of the political
power to the financiers and are unable to promote or even back actions that
would not receive full endorsement by the large private economic groups.
For these reasons, if one were to single out the policy or set of
related policies that have contributed most to promote competition and the
modernization and international competitiveness of the Colombian productive
sectors, that policy, without doubt, would be the liberalization of trade.  It
had immediate and profound consequences over private investment, market
organization and productivity.  It shook up the economic groups and awakened
them from the inaction induced by protected markets and private non-aggression
agreements that were possible in a closed economy.  It set them to compete to
position themselves in the new markets opened up by deregulation and
privatization.  There is also renewed competition in the markets that had been
protected by the pre-existing gentlemen agreements, as has been the case in
the beer and soft-drink markets in Colombia.  All the other reform efforts of
the Barco and Gaviria administrations will probably induce changes in the
organization of several sectors that would result in a more competitive
business environment in the future, but their effects are not as swift as
those of the “apertura.”  However, the other legal reforms have cut very deep
and the charges can be labeled almost revolutionary, at least on paper.  The
legal framework is now adequate for the application of pro-competition
policies.
Additionally, the country showed that it has the political will to
change - which was an element that was in doubt until the Gaviria years - andthat the economic groups, although very powerful, can be effectively
outmaneuvered if the government displays good politics and good ideas. 
Further reform will need less legislative action and more, much more,
administrative and real action.
What happened at the beginning of the Gaviria administration that made
it possible for the government to obtain far-reaching reform legislation so
swiftly? Gaviria came to power fortuitously --a dark horse that appeared in
the presidential race after Galan’s assassination-- and did not owe his
candidacy or the presidency to the backing of economic groups, nor to the
traditional factions in the liberal party who had endorsed other candidates in
the primary elections.  When he prepared his economic and political platforms
for the final election he already was virtually president and was the
undisputed leader of the liberal party--the traditionalists jockeying for
positions, particularly those who had not supported him in the primary
election.  In these conditions, the candidate’s team of advisors had time to
prepare a wide-raging government program and draft reform proposals which were
discussed and cleared with Gaviria well in advance of his election.  After he
was elected he sought consensus in the technocratic establishment ad built
bridges with the politicians.
In his inaugural speech he announced and outlined his main policies,
which already had been developed and very rapidly went to Congress as part of
an ambitious package of reforms.  Traditionally, the first months of a
presidential term enjoy what is called a “honeymoon” with Congress; this time
it was heightened by the fact that the leading liberal political barons had
opposed Gaviria and wanted to mend fences.  Congress also was pressured
because the electorate had overwhelmingly voted for the convocation of a
constitutional assembly--a competing legislative body-- to change the
Constitution.  Congress decided then to show that it could work efficiently
and set out to work on the reform program with unprecedented enthusiasm and
discipline.Meanwhile, the rest of the country had its attention focused on the
“apertura” program and the dispute going on within government about the speed
at which this program should be applied, on the election of the constitutional
assembly and on the twin wars against the Medellin cartel that was bombing the
cities and the guerrillas that were bombing the oil pipelines.  The tax reform
that was being processed along with the reform package concentrated the
attention of lobbyists and the press and the labor reform obtained all the
backing of the private sector and distracted the attention of the labor
movements.  The rest of the legislative agenda was not in the main stream of
consciousness of the public nor did it figure in the priority list of the
private sector.  For example, the Federation of Coffee Growers became aware
that the National Coffee Fund regime that had been practically unaltered for
fifty years was being changed in Congress, only the morning after it had been
voted in the Senate commission of economic affairs.  After that day, they had
two of their more skilled senior vice-presidents sitting in the discussions
full time to monitor the progress of the law and steer its contents.  But the
main objective had already been accomplished: Congress had dared to change a
Colombian totem --the foreign exchange regime and the chapters dealing with
the mechanisms of the coffee board and stabilization fund-- without a previous
nod by the coffee growers organization.  Despite the announcements made by
Gaviria during his inaugural speech in which he outlined all the reforms he
intended to pursue, the private sector and the public did not expect that all
of them would be presented at once and much less that Congress would attempt
to pass them all in one session.  This explains why the pressure groups were
ill-prepared for the legislative “blietzkrieg” engineered by government and
why their intervention was delayed and largely ineffective.
Some Ethical Considerations Around Economic Liberalization
The tax reform of 1990 contained a tax jubileum for returning capital
flight and the reform of the exchange regime legalized the tenure of foreign
assets by Colombian residents, which had been outlawed by the 1967 foreign26  Urrutia, Miguel. op.cit. Table 11.1 p.371
27  Hommes, Rudolf. “Capital Flight: Colombia” in  Capital Flight: The Problem and
Policy Responses. Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 1986
exchange regime of the Carlos Lleras administration.  The fact was that most
Colombians who could afford it had assets abroad and that violations of the
foreign exchange regime did not carry any social sanction.  Moreover, a very
active parallel exchange market was openly operated and tolerated.  The
parallel exchange rate carried a small premium or a small discount over the
official rate.   These were normally of the order of one to five percent, 26
except for the 1983-1984 when the official exchange rate was fourteen percent
lower than the black market rate.  At some point during this period, the
differential was as high as thirty percent.  That year was characterized by a
confidence crisis, a financial crisis and a massive change of land property
between the old landed proprietors and the new rich, some of them presumably
connected to drug organizations. 27
The legislation of a free exchange and allowing Colombians to bring back
their foreign assets without being penalized cleared the way for introducing
new measures to control money laundering which had been impossible to
implement in the old regime.  Under the pre-existing foreign exchange regime,
it was impossible to ascertain who was violating the law just for their own
portfolio precautionary reasons and who was a money launderer.  Under the new
system it could be assumed that if the assets were not registered for tax
purposes, taking advantage of the tax jubileum, they could be investigated. 
To make this more effective, an agreement was negotiated between the Colombian
and U.S. tax authorities regarding the exchange of information about Colombian
and U.S. taxpayers and Congress authorized government to sign this agreement
in exchange for the tax jubileum.  Before the legal change of regime, the
Colombian authorities had been reluctant to pursue an agreement of this nature
because many prominent Colombian names would come out, linked to a socially
accepted and condoned but illegal behavior --dodging the exchange controls. The liberalization also made it possible to apply the standard international
controls of money laundering and to hold banks operating in Colombia legally
responsible for reporting any unusual or suspicious movements of funds.  In
this way, deregulation of capital flows enhanced the opportunities to
implement more strict controls to money laundering.
Conclusion
This brings into account the question of what kind of policies are the
best suited for a small democratic small country like Colombia.  As in the
case of Denmark, Sweden or the Netherlands, local firms must develop into
large enterprises to be able to compete in the world markets.  At the same
time, the preservation of democracy requires that the political involvement of
big business be checked because it may lead to the excessive concentration of
political power.
In this context, the “apertura” has shown already some positive results. 
Maintaining an open economy will ensure that domestic monopolies invest in
their core business and expand it to capture economies of scale and scope. 
This will probably induce direct foreign investment of Colombian firms abroad
and an expansion of exports in the medium to long run, because the firms will
have to acquire “world size” to compete in an open market.  This requires a
fairly open capital account that permits this type of reverse foreign
investment without the interference of government, or a bureaucratic mentality
that would allow these flows even with a restrictive foreign exchange regime. 
In the past, the capital account was closed and the bureaucratic mentality was
opposed to Colombian direct investment abroad.  This brought about three
undesirable consequences: Foreign investment by Colombian firms was limited to
those that had the political clout to obtain the licenses; and even in those
cases, it was severely restricted.  All other firms had to do it illegally or
could not do it at all.  As a consequence, many Colombian business could not
compete advantageously in foreign markets unless they broke the law.  This wasexemplified by the flower exporters whose investment in warehouses and
distribution channels was impeded by the central bank bureaucracy.
In the case of large enterprises like those in the beverage and bee
sector that generate autonomously large cash surpluses, or the cement sector
that also generates large cash flows as a consequence of growth of housing and
construction, the firms were prevented from investing the resources abroad in
the same core business and this contributed to speeding up the concentration
and the strengthening of conglomerates of the private sector, since it had to
find outlets for the cash flow, greatly augmented by the preferential
subsidized credit that flowed from the central bank through the financial
sector to the firms that could offer the best collateral.
In an open economy, the firms will do what comes most naturally which is
to expand the core business internationally or to increase the scope of the
core production.  Both phenomena are taking place in Colombia at the present
time, but conglomerates continue to grow and will continue as long as the
largest firms or groups have privileged access to financial resources and the
stock market prices remain fairly depressed and not competitive.  In this
respect, the role of the government beyond fostering competition in the goods
markets, should focus on promoting competition in the financial and capital
markets and leaves firms alone in their decisions regarding size and vertical
or horizontal integration.
In the public services sectors, the problem is that the monopoly is of
the state.  Take for example the electrical sector: One public firm owns the
national grid and the largest capacity of hydroelectric generating power.  The
same firm has a regulatory role and sets the rules for dispatching energy and
for acquiring it from hydroelectric or other sources.  If one compares this
with a more liberal environment in which the generating capacity is
diversified in private hands, the grid is a highly regulated private firm that
acquires energy at market prices, dispatching according to legally set rules,
and the regulation is by an independent government commission.  Undoubtedlymore private investment (and more competition) are expected to flow into the
second model than into the first.  This example was selected to make a point: 
the regulations are in place to permit private investment in the public sector
services, and there is already some investment, but true competition and
dynamic investment will follow only when the government reduces its
participation and dominance by selling existing assets and effectively
privatizing the electrical sector.  The same holds true for banking, gas
distribution and production, transportation, telecommunications and all other
public services.  In other words, greater privatization of public services in
Colombia is a necessary condition to promote private investment and
competition.
The agenda for a would-be promoter of competitiveness in the Colombian
markets if fairly clear-cut: there is a first stage of competition enhancement
that does not require excessive political courage and will not encounter
unsustainable opposition.  This encompasses maintaining an open trade policy,
privatization of public services, allowing Colombian foreign direct investment
to grow abroad and encouraging foreign direct investment into the country. 
This, in turn, is achieved maintaining stable rules, giving foreign investors
the same treatment given to domestic investors, and deregulating foreign
investment --which has already been done-- and offering stable macroeconomic
and political conditions.  Furthermore, legislation is required to bring down
barriers to entry into different sectors and to permit private investment in
sectors where public investment dominates.  A lot of progress has already been
done in Colombia on all these fronts.  Additionally, a workable set of rules
has been devised and has been in place for many years that permit regulation
of monopoly and oligopoly by the central government superintendencies and by
the regulatory commissions.  These powers, in the case of anti-trust actions
have been greatly augmented for the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce
and for the Superintendency of Banks.
The second stage of the process, which requires great political skillsand power to implement, is to control the behavior of oligopolies in the
domestic market.  The objective of such a policy cannot be to prevent or
hinder the growth of firms, because size will be required to face
international competition abroad and domestically, but rather, to regulate the
activities of leading firms in the domestic markets so that they do not hinder
the growth and development of competitor corporations in terms of services and
size, do not conspire to fix prices or to segment markets, and do not erect
insurmountable barriers to the entry of new firms into their markets.  This
would require a government decision to go ahead with the policy and the
maintenance of a consistent course during several administrations.  A policy
of this nature would necessarily have a constituency that has been absent in
Colombia in the twentieth century.  This would be akin to the grass-roots
movement that led to the anti-trust legislation of the late nineteenth century
in the United States or to the political coalition that made possible in the
same country the strengthening of the Clayton Act, or the functioning of the
Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
thirties.  Until political conditions arise, the existing legislation will
probably lie dormant as a testimony to the countervailing power of Colombian
economic conglomerates.  Roughly the same can be observed in the case of
security and exchange regulations for a stock market that does not really
exist, while failure of disclosure is widespread and management and dominant
stockholder groups have been fairly free to use corporate power, credit and
cash flows for their in the commercial code, waiting for a government that has
the will and the political power to bring them to life.  This would
undoubtedly require also a reform of the rules that regulate the financing of
political campaigns and public officials.
A third, and much higher stage of reformism dealing with the control of
economic power would respond to the question of how much economic power is too
much.  One is reminded that Standard Oil was broken into several companies,
not only because it was too big, but because it had so much political powerthat it threatened the public interest.  This is very pertinent in the case of
Colombia where the public interest lies precisely in preserving some form of
democracy and promoting a pluralist society.  The domination of politics by
conglomerates weaken democracy and creates the conditions for the development
of capitalism under more authoritarian modes of government which would have
business as their sole constituency and could lead to latter- day mutations of
fascism or to militarism.  One does not have to go to far back in Latin
American history to observe the consequences of these type of governments and
of their corporatist economic structure.
In Colombia, one group, very often a single person, controls banks and
communications media, in addition to the productive and commercial activities. 
This concentration of power is not well suited to a democratic society,
however, under the present political and economic conditions of Colombia,
given the state of awareness of the middle-class it is hard to envision a
government that would be willing to tackle this problem.
Probably, it would be wiser to start with more modest goals such as
developing the bureaucracies that would be responsible for the application of
the anti-trust legislation, the rules of securities and exchange and the
commercial code.  Strengthening these bureaucracies and backing their
activities in a setting of moderate reform goals, directed at stemming the
misuse of the market power of monopolies, oligopolies and conglomerates will
probably achieve much more than over-reaching.  The problem is more political
than economic, and therefore it is difficult to predict the future course of
events.  A good cause for hope is to observe that these problems have been
solved in some other countries with economic and political development, but
not always and not everywhere.
ANNEX
The Regulatory and Structural Reforms of The Gaviria Administration
1990 - 1994Apertura.  In 1990, Colombia had the highest tariffs in the region and,
one of the least open economies of the Andean countries, despite a trade
reform effort that had been undertaken by the Barco administration.  During
the last year of that administration, a gradualist five-year trade
liberalization program was initiated.  The Barco reform was to have three
steps: (a) the liberalization of trade for goods that did not compete with
domestic products, which involved moving those tariff items from the
restricted import to the free trade list; (b) a two-year sub-program involving
the gradual substitution of quantitative restrictions would be completely
eliminated, a three-year period of tariff reduction would ensue.  During the
first two years of the program, the government would have auctioned import
licenses for the items that were on the restricted list, to determine an
initial level of protection.  The goal of the program was to reduce tariffs to
an average level of 25%.  Additionally, in order to prevent a huge initial
current account deficit, nominal devaluation was accelerated to record levels
during 1990, achieving a real devaluation of nearly 17% for the whole year. 
This policy was embraced by the Gaviria administration and contributed to a
record inflation rate of 32.4 percent in 1990 and to also a record jump in the
value of non-traditional exports which increased more than 30 percent, in
dollar terms in 1991.
The foreign trade reform started in 1990 was much more ambitious and
straight-forward than the Barco experiment.  During the first four months of
the Gaviria administration, quantitative restrictions were practically
eliminated.  This involved moving from an environment of quantitative input
restrictions such as import quotas, import licenses and lists of products of
forbidden importation, to free trade.  At the same time, the reduction of
import tariffs was accelerated.
Initially, due to the pressures of the more conservative members of
government that represented the point of view of several business sectors, a
four year reduction program was initiated and announced, which would have28  Article 333, Constitución Política de Colombia, (Bogotá, Presidencia de la
República, 1991), p. 129.
29  Article 334, Ibid., p. 130
brought average tariffs down to 12% by the end of 1993.  This gradualism
proved to be impractical because importers and investors took a “wait-and-see”
attitude that resulted in a very large current account surplus and a
corresponding increase in the level of international reserves and the money
base.  The liberalization program was accelerated during the first seven
months of 1991.  As a result, tariffs were drastically reduced from an average
of 38.6% in 1990 to less than 12% in 1991 where they have remained.
Constitutional Reform and Derived Legislation .  The constitutional
reform of 1991 established (a) that economic activities and private
initiatives are free, limited only by the “common” good; (b) that nobody can
impose licensing or other requirements without legal authorization; © that
free competition is a universal right that presupposes responsibilities and
obligations for enterprises; and (d) that the state, mandated by the law, is
constitutionally responsible for impeding restrictions to economic freedom and
controlling abuses of the dominant position of firms or individuals in the
domestic market.28
Additionally, the new constitution directly authorized the state to
intervene in the general direction of the economy and to “promote productivity
and competitiveness.”  It also established that the law can mandate the
government to intervene “in the exploitation of natural resources, the use of
the soil, the production, distribution, utilization and consumption of goods
and in the public and private services, to rationalize the economy with the
purpose of obtaining an improvement in the quality of life of the population,
the equitable distribution of opportunities and the benefits of development
and the conservation of the environment.”   Furthermore, it prohibits the 29
creation of legal monopolies, excepting the old Spanish revenue raising
monopolies such as liquor production or gambling; but it limits these to those30  Article 336, Ibid., p. 130.
established with purposes of public interest, and according to the law. 30
Financial Sector Reform.  The deregulation of the Colombian financial
sector was started in 1990 with a new law that encompassed the regulatory
environment for financial institutions in Colombia (Ley 45/1990).  This law
permitted complete ownership of Colombian banks by foreign stockholders
including banks, which has been forbidden since 1975, and removed the existing
barriers to foreign investment in the financial sector.  It also reformed the
system of specialized banking that was the norm in Colombia since 1923 and
moved towards universal banking by allowing finance corporations to offer
savings accounts and by permitting financial institutions to own specialized
financial service institutions - like brokerage, leasing or factoring.  They
themselves had been prevented from supplying these same services under the
previously existing system and are not allowed to provide them directly under
the new law.  Although, this law sought to reduce the segmentation of the
market induced by the specialized banking system and by over-regulation of the
financial sector, it fell short of instituting universal banking because of
the strong opposition to liberalization from the Colombian central bank and
the more conservative elements of the political sector.  As a consequence, the
new system continues to induce market segmentation and to prevent competition
but it helped to increase transparency by regulating the disclosure of
information by financial institutions, albeit at a lower level.
Additionally, it established clearly the requirements for licensing new
institutions and the minimum capital requirements for each type of new
financial institution.  These innovations lowered considerably the barriers of
entrance in the financial sector because the bank superintendent had
previously had the autonomy to grant or deny licenses, choosing often to deny
them without explanation.
After the new constitution was approved, this legislation wascomplemented by another law (Ley 35/1993) that established the rules for the
intervention of government in the financial sector.  This law develops the
constitutional authorization to the government to intervene in the financial
markets or financial institutions to protect the investors and users of the
system, to seek adequate levels of capitalization of the financial
institutions, to promote competition and to foster transparency.  It also
rules that government should specify maximum levels of credit or of risk
exposure per borrower and provide lending guidelines that would help prevent
credit discrimination.
The law also contributed to bring down the barriers to competition by
allowing the mortgage corporations (corporaciones de ahorro y vivienda) to
create or acquire financial service companies and by authorizing these
institutions and the commercial finance companies to participate in the
foreign exchange market.  This market had been reserved previously for the
commercial banks and the finance corporations which were the only institutions
allowed to buy, hold and sell foreign exchange on a commercial basis.
  Reform of the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce.  Under the new
charter, the Superintendency was given the following functions: (a) To watch
for the observance of the laws and regulations that deal with the promotion of
competition and with restrictive commercial practices; (b) to follow-up
complaints dealing with market competition and to process those cases in which
the action of the Superintendency would increase the efficiency of production;
those that would insure that consumers have freedom of choice or better access
to markets; those that would increase the participation of firms in the
markets; and those fostering variety in prices and quality of goods and
services. It was empowered to give fines and other penalties to firms that
restrict trade or did not comply with guidelines issued by the agency; and to
act at the request of the public service regulatory commissions when public or
private firms obstruct free competition or when they violate the regulations
pertaining to tariffs, collections, trade or client relations. It was alsorequired to watch the observance of regulations dealing with consumer
protection and to accept complaints in those matters when they are not of the
jurisdiction of other agencies. In those cases, the Superintendency can
establish responsibilities and issue instructions that must be obeyed. To
achieve this mandate, the Superintendency was authorized to visit firms, to
obtain all the relevant information and to interrogate under oath anybody
whose testimony may "result useful" in the exercise of its functions. In
addition to the functions of the agency, the same decree defined very
specifically what acts, conducts, or agreements affected free competition,
singled out which ones are contrary to free trade and competition, and
specified what is the “abuse of dominant position” in a market.  It also
delimited the power of the Superintendency to intervene in the case of mergers
and acquisitions (it cannot act when the parties can demonstrate that
efficiency gains can be derived from the transaction or a reduction of cost
would ensue that could not be achieved by other means). 
It was also determined that the Superintendency could act in all cases
on its own accord or when a complaint is filed. In this case, it is authorized
to conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine if there is cause to proceed.
When a process is concluded, the investigators would inform the Superintendent
who, in turn, would inform the subject of the investigation. He or it can
inhibit the process by altering the behavior that would otherwise be
punishable by fines amounting to 300 times the monthly minimum salary. These
provisions were designed to fill some of the gaps that were left open in the
1959 law that rendered it inapplicable. The objective was only partially
accomplished due to the restrictions imposed by the legal and constitutional
authorizations. For example, the Superintendency cannot act in the
communications and media sector on its own accord, and it is confined to
follow up complaints that are filed with it. Consequently, even though it is
widely known that there are violations to the existing rules of competition in
television, it cannot act until there is an independent complaint.The Regulation of Public Services. The regulatory law for the electrical
sector (Law 143/1994) determines that the state is responsible, in relation to
the provision of electricity services, to promote free competition in the
activities of the sector; to prevent unfair competition or abuse of the
dominant position in the sector; to protect the users; and to regulate the
circumstances in which natural monopolies arise and free competition is unable
to guarantee the efficient provision of services at the lowest possible
economic cost. The law guarantees that private or mixed ownership -public and
private- enterprises are free to develop their activities in the context of
free competition, regulated by the government.
The law created a commission for energy and gas regulation composed by
eight members, three of which represent the ministries of Mines and Energy,
Finance and Planning, and five members appointed by the President for a four-
year period. This commission has the responsibility to regulate the energy
sector with the basic objective of supplying electricity  and gas at the
lowest cost possible, utilizing the available resources and providing
opportune and quality service to the users. All this is to be achieved in the
context of free competition and the commission has a mandate to promote and
create the conditions for freer competition. The law also rules that
electricity generation is allowed for all economic agents and that they can
sell this electricity freely at market rates. The owners of the national
networks are required to interconnect suppliers and users at pre-established
and regulated tariffs. The abuse of dominant position or the violation of the
norms of free competition in the energy markets are clearly defined and the
penalties for these violations are defined as well, ranging from warning by
the authorities to fines and administrative actions such as ordering the
dismissal of management or temporary takeover of the management by the
government. The law contains also provisions to foster competition and to
punish unlawful conducts interfering with this purpose and to impose strict
penalties in those instances.31  Colombia.  Private Sector Assessment.  (Washington, World Bank Draft, August
1994), p. 62.
Transportation.  In air transportation, deregulation was also
implemented.  Increased competition in the airline sector has changed
significantly the market structure of the service.  The leading company -
AVIANCA- decreased its share of augmented international flights from 56% in
1990 to 35% in 1993 and the share of the domestic market from 49% to 38%.  As
a consequence, the company had to invest in fleet renewal and upgrading of
services what it had not invested in many years.  It has also drastically
reduced its personnel from 7000 in 1990 to just over 4000 in 1993. 31
Land transportation has also benefited from the apertura.  Before 1990,
the government allotted import licenses of transportation equipment with the
idea of protecting the existing shipping companies from excessive competition. 
After 1990, trucks and all transportation equipment can be freely imported. 
As a result, shipping tariffs decreased 50% in real terms between 1990 and
1993.
The railway sector was one of the first sectors to be deregulated in
Colombia, in the last year of the Barco presidency.  The almost extinct
monopoly -Ferrocarriles Nacionales- was dissolved and two new companies were
created: a public company that is responsible for the upgrading, expansion,
maintenance of the rail network and regulation of tariffs, and a private
company that would run the trains.  So far, the reform has failed to produce
results.
The deregulation of the shipping sector has been very drastic.  The
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, a public shipping firm jointly owned by the
National Coffee Fund of Colombia and the government of Ecuador had virtual
monopoly based on the “flag reserve” which reserved 50% of the foreign
shipping to domestic carriers.  Since other domestic shipping lines were very
small, this firm practically dominated the market, offering poor service at
high non-competitive tariffs.  Beginning in 1989, the government started a32  Ibid., pp. 69-70.
gradual deregulation program that was accelerated in 1991 when it abolished
the quota and allowed free entrance of foreign ships to Colombian ports,
excepting those from countries that do not grant reciprocal treatment to
Colombian carriers.  The share of the market of the Colombian line was
drastically reduced and it was forced to restructure.  This brought down
prices significantly and increased the supply and quality of services. 32
Port Regulation.  The ports had been strictly a public sector activity
until 1991. In that year a law was issued that permitted the liquidation of
the national port company and allowed private sector investment and management
in the operation of the Colombian ports; it created also a new Superintendency
of Transportation and Public Works that oversees the port activities,
regulates tariffs and intervenes to secure land where new facilities have to
be build and the private negotiations are stalled (Ley 1/1991). This
legislation was complemented in 1992 by a decree (Decreto 2171/1992), which
restructured the Ministry of Transportation and its agencies. These norms
authorized the government to lease or sell the existing facilities to
independent port companies that can be partially or wholly owned by the
private sector. As a result of the new regulations, Colombian ports are now
managed with private sector participation, new private ports have been
constructed and tariffs have decreased substantially. 